The Janus Face of Bank Geographic Complexity

56 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2020

See all articles by Iñaki Aldasoro

Iñaki Aldasoro

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Bryan Hardy

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) - Monetary and Economic Department

Maximilian Jager

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 20, 2020

Abstract

We study the relationship between bank geographic complexity and risk using a unique dataset of 96 global bank holding companies (BHCs) over 2008-2016. From data on the affiliate network of internationally active banking entities, we construct a measure of geographic coverage and complexity for each BHC. We find that higher geographic complexity heightens banks' capacity to absorb local economic shocks, reducing their risk. However, higher geographic complexity is also associated with a higher vulnerability to global shocks and less impact of prudential regulation, increasing their risk. Geographic complexity helps more (with respect to local shocks) and hurts less (with respect to global shocks) if countries' business cycles are misaligned. Large, international regulatory reforms such as the implementation of the GSIB framework and the European Single Supervisory Mechanism reduce bank risk, but geographic complexity weakens this effect. Bank geographic complexity therefore has a Janus face, decreasing some but increasing other aspects of bank risk.

Keywords: bank geographic complexity, bank risk, bank regulation, GSIB

JEL Classification: G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Aldasoro, Iñaki and Hardy, Bryan and Jager, Maximilian, The Janus Face of Bank Geographic Complexity (April 20, 2020). BIS Working Paper No. 858, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3584705

Iñaki Aldasoro (Contact Author)

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
Basel, Basel-Stadt 4002
Switzerland

Bryan Hardy

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) - Monetary and Economic Department ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
CH-4002 Basel
Switzerland

Maximilian Jager

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

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