Delegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit

87 Pages Posted: 21 May 2020 Last revised: 10 Aug 2024

See all articles by Bo Cowgill

Bo Cowgill

Columbia University - Columbia Business School

Patryk Perkowski

Yeshiva University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 25, 2020

Abstract

Firms increasingly delegate job screening to third-party recruiters, who must not only satisfy employers' demand for different types of candidates, but also manage yield by anticipating candidates' likelihood of accepting offers. We study how recruiters balance these objectives in a novel, two-sided field experiment. Our results suggest that candidates' behavior towards employers is very correlated, but that employers' hiring behavior is more idiosyncratic. Workers discriminate using the race and gender of the employer's leaders more than employers discriminate against the candidate's race and gender. Black and female candidates face particularly high uncertainty, as their callback rates vary widely across employers. Callback decisions place about 2/3rds weight on employer's expected behavior and 1/3rd on yield management. We conclude by discussing the accuracy of recruiter beliefs and how they impact labor market sorting.

Keywords: Hiring, intermediaries, discrimination, field experiments

JEL Classification: J71, M51, C95

Suggested Citation

Cowgill, Bo and Perkowski, Patryk, Delegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit (April 25, 2020). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 898, Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 0 [10.1086/732127], Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3584919 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/732127

Bo Cowgill (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Patryk Perkowski

Yeshiva University ( email )

500 West 185th Street
New York, NY 10033
United States

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