The Conceptual Gap Between Doré and Vavilov

Dalhousie Law Journal (2020)

29 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2020

Date Written: April 27, 2020

Abstract

This paper argues that, without substantial doctrinal amendment, there is a fundamental conceptual gap between the cases of Doré and Vavilov. This is because both cases are motivated by different conceptions of administrative law. In Vavilov, the paper suggests that the Court melded together two theories of judicial review: first, a Diceyan theory based on a harmonious understanding of the principles of legislative sovereignty and the Rule of Law; and second, the imposition of a “culture of justification” for administrative decision-makers, in which decision-makers are asked to justify their decisions to receive deference. On the other hand, Doré is motivated by a pure functionalist understanding of administrative law, in which the expertise of the decision-maker in deciding constitutional matters is emphasized. While not total opposites, the theories are also not entirely complementary, such that they lead to different doctrinal prescriptions. The paper explores the doctrinal gap, and suggests two ways in which it might be bridged. First, Doré might be recalibrated to bifurcate the standard of review analysis, so that decisions implicating the scope of Charter rights are reviewed on a correctness standard, while the proportionality/application stage is reviewed on a reasonableness standard. Second, Vavilov’s justificatory standards might be imported into the Doré context to bridge the gap.

Suggested Citation

Mancini, Mark, The Conceptual Gap Between Doré and Vavilov (April 27, 2020). Dalhousie Law Journal (2020), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3586079

Mark Mancini (Contact Author)

Runnymede Society ( email )

6025-12 St SE, Suite 215
Calgary, Alberta T2H2K1
Canada

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