Deception, Social Preferences, and Friendship

51 Pages Posted: 28 May 2020

See all articles by sandra maximiano

sandra maximiano

University of Lisbon - ISEG School of Economics and Management

Sugato Chakravarty

Date Written: October 2016

Abstract

We investigate the interaction between friendship, social preferences, and deceptive behavior. We implement a sender- receiver game, in which senders choose from a distinct set of allocations that embodies a multi-dimensional set of potential lies. A novelty of our design is that it directly distinguishes between lying aversion and outcome oriented social preferences without the need for explicitly eliciting social preferences. We consider a “strangers” treatment and a “friends” treatment. Results show that subjects are less likely to lie to friends than to strangers; that they have different degrees of lying aversion, and that they lie according to their social preferences. Pro-social individuals appear more lying averse. If they do lie, they are equally likely to do so with friends as with strangers.

Keywords: sender-receiver game, deception, lying aversion, social ties, social preferences

JEL Classification: C92, D03

Suggested Citation

maximiano, sandra and Chakravarty, Sugato, Deception, Social Preferences, and Friendship (October 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589537 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3589537

Sandra Maximiano (Contact Author)

University of Lisbon - ISEG School of Economics and Management ( email )

Rua do Quelhas 6
Lisboa, 1200-781
Portugal

No contact information is available for Sugato Chakravarty

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