Monetary Financing and Fiscal Discipline

Oxford University Nuffield College Working Paper 2020-01

24 Pages Posted: 28 May 2020

See all articles by Oliver Hülsewig

Oliver Hülsewig

Munich University of Applied Sciences; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Armin Steinbach

HEC Paris; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Date Written: April 7, 2020

Abstract

Rules governing monetary state financing vary across jurisdictions. The mainstream rationale for bans of state financing rests on the empirical assumption that monetary financing undermines fiscal discipline. We address the plausibility of this assumption by estimating panel vector auto-regressive (VAR) models for euro area Mediterranean crisis countries over the period 2010-2018 to explore the reaction of the sovereigns’ fiscal position to a monetary policy shock. Our results suggest that fiscal discipline is not waning after an expansionary monetary policy innovation related to unconventional measures, as expressed through an improvement of the primary balance despite declining borrowing costs. While no compelling inferences can be made as to the driving force of this improvement – political pressure channeled through conditionality may be a plausible explanation – our results suggest that we can dismiss empirical claims on the adverse effect of unconventional monetary policy on fiscal discipline.

Keywords: Monetary Financing, Fiscal Discipline, Unconventional Monetary Policy, Panel Vector Auto-regressive Model

JEL Classification: E52, E62, H63, K33

Suggested Citation

Hülsewig, Oliver and Steinbach, Armin, Monetary Financing and Fiscal Discipline (April 7, 2020). Oxford University Nuffield College Working Paper 2020-01, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589859 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3589859

Oliver Hülsewig

Munich University of Applied Sciences ( email )

Munich
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt Schumacher Str 10
Bonn, 53113
Germany

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