Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set Revisited

8 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2020

See all articles by Jonathan Newton

Jonathan Newton

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research

Date Written: May 1, 2020

Abstract

A counterexample is given to Lemma 1 of Ray and Vohra (2019). This lemma is a key part of the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 1) of the cited paper. We give an additional condition under which Lemma 1 holds. This condition specifies that when a coalition of players T is broken up by the participation of some of its players in an coalitional move by S , then the new coalitions and payoffs for the remainder of the players T \ S depend on neither the coalitions and payoffs of players outside of T before the breakup, nor the coalitions and payoffs of players outside of T \ S after the breakup, nor the identities of players in S who are not members of T.

Keywords: Stables sets, farsightedness

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Newton, Jonathan, Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set Revisited (May 1, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3590816 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3590816

Jonathan Newton (Contact Author)

Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
JAPAN

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