Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set Revisited
8 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2020
Date Written: May 1, 2020
Abstract
A counterexample is given to Lemma 1 of Ray and Vohra (2019). This lemma is a key part of the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 1) of the cited paper. We give an additional condition under which Lemma 1 holds. This condition specifies that when a coalition of players T is broken up by the participation of some of its players in an coalitional move by S , then the new coalitions and payoffs for the remainder of the players T \ S depend on neither the coalitions and payoffs of players outside of T before the breakup, nor the coalitions and payoffs of players outside of T \ S after the breakup, nor the identities of players in S who are not members of T.
Keywords: Stables sets, farsightedness
JEL Classification: C71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation