The Data Sharing Paradox: BigTechs in Finance

forthcoming in European Competition Journal

13 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2020 Last revised: 19 Aug 2020

See all articles by Oscar Borgogno

Oscar Borgogno

Bank of Italy

Giuseppe Colangelo

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics; Stanford Law School; LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management

Date Written: May 28, 2020

Abstract

The European wave of regulatory interventions aimed at promoting access to data and data sharing shows no signs of stopping. However, concerns are being expressed about alleged unintended consequences of data portability in financial markets. In particular, new calls have been voiced to contain the engagement of BigTech platforms with retail banking. The paper argues that asymmetrical regulatory measures imposed on BigTechs entry in the financial industry are likely to tilt the market in favor of incumbent banks to the detriment of small players as well as consumer welfare. Such an early regulatory intervention would actively help larger traditional banks to entrench their market power further, ultimately frustrating the pro-competitive potential of the access to account rule enshrined in the revised Payment Service Directive (PSD2).

Keywords: Big data, BigTech, FinTech, digital platforms, financial markets, PSD2, access to account rule, competition law, regulation

JEL Classification: K21, K22, K23, L15

Suggested Citation

Borgogno, Oscar and Colangelo, Giuseppe, The Data Sharing Paradox: BigTechs in Finance (May 28, 2020). forthcoming in European Competition Journal, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3591205 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3591205

Oscar Borgogno (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
00184 Roma
Italy

Giuseppe Colangelo

University of Basilicata, Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics ( email )

Via dell'Ateneo Lucano 10
Potenza
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/home

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.stanford.edu/transatlantic-technology-law-forum/

LUISS Guido Carli, Department of Business and Management ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Rome, Roma 00197
Italy

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