Antitrust House Judiciary Committee Antitrust Subcommittee Testimony

30 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2020

See all articles by D. Daniel Sokol

D. Daniel Sokol

University of Florida Levin College of Law

Date Written: May 4, 2020

Abstract

Much of the competition policy discussion today centers around goals of antitrust. Until recently, the only antitrust goals discussed in the US were economic ones. Anyone who thought otherwise was on the fringe and often discounted both academically and within policy circles. Yet today, the goals of antitrust once again have become the subject of debate due to a concatenation of events. Growing populism on both the left and right in the United States and globally; a number of studies showing increased income inequality and increased concentration; digital transformations across industries that disrupt traditional ways of organizing economic activity and life more generally; trends towards protectionism and economic sovereignty; and the lingering effects of the Great Recession in some countries all have caused people in policy settings, some antitrust authorities, and some scholars to question whether an economics-based goal focused on effects to consumer and competition (which for shorthand I call the “consumer welfare” standard) is relevant and whether competition can be used to achieve particular results.

This testimony before the House Judiciary Committee Antitrust Subcommittee covers the following topics:

The Importance of Economic Analysis and Antitrust Common Law

Fairness in Antitrust

Antitrust instrumentalization

Antitrust and “Tech”

Bipartisan support for economic analysis in antitrust

Courts have expressly embraced economic analysis

Antitrust Non-Price Enforcement

Antitrust history offers an example of what political antitrust can do (badly)

Merger thresholds are adequate

Agencies, guided by economic analysis, do a good job given the overall uncertainty of addressing mergers

Are tech acquisitions different for start ups?

How should we think about vertical mergers?

Agencies should not be duplicative of investigations into the same companies

Agencies should invest in more tech knowledge

Agencies need to better understand the value of different types of platforms

More money invested in competition advocacy

Keywords: antitrust, competition law, monopolization, mergers, exclusionary conduct, tech, platforms, Robinson Patman, institutional design

JEL Classification: K21, K41, K42, l12, l4, l40, l41

Suggested Citation

Sokol, D. Daniel, Antitrust House Judiciary Committee Antitrust Subcommittee Testimony (May 4, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592567 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3592567

D. Daniel Sokol (Contact Author)

University of Florida Levin College of Law ( email )

Spessard L. Holland Law Center
P.O. Box 117625
Gainesville, FL 32611-7625
United States
(352) 273-0968 (Phone)
(352) 392-3005 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.ufl.edu/faculty/d-daniel-sokol

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