Trade‐Offs between Civil Liberties and National Security: A Discrete Choice Experiment

20 Pages Posted: 6 May 2020

See all articles by Eric Andrew Finkelstein

Eric Andrew Finkelstein

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Carol Mansfield

Research Triangle Institute - Center for Economics Research (CER)

Dallas Wood

RTI International

Brent Rowe

RTI International

Junxing Chay

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Semra Ozdemir

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: April 2017

Abstract

We explore differences in perception of national security policies between self‐identified liberals, moderates, and conservatives from a national sample of U.S. adults. Using a discrete choice experiment, we also quantify each group's willingness to trade off select policies in exchange for reduced risk of a 9/11‐style terrorist attack. Relative to other groups, liberals are more likely to view such policies as ineffective and susceptible to government abuse. They also perceive a lower threat of terrorism. All groups are willing to make trade‐offs between civil liberties and risk of a terrorist attack. However, loss of civil liberties affects liberals more than conservatives.

JEL Classification: D61, H41, H56

Suggested Citation

Finkelstein, Eric Andrew and Mansfield, Carol and Wood, Dallas and Rowe, Brent and Chay, Junxing and Ozdemir, Semra, Trade‐Offs between Civil Liberties and National Security: A Discrete Choice Experiment (April 2017). Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 35, Issue 2, pp. 292-311, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3593646 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/coep.12188

Eric Andrew Finkelstein (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Carol Mansfield

Research Triangle Institute - Center for Economics Research (CER) ( email )

3040 Cornwallis Road
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194
United States

Dallas Wood

RTI International ( email )

PO Box 12194
Research Triangle Park, 27709
United States
9195417206 (Phone)
9195417206 (Fax)

Brent Rowe

RTI International ( email )

PO Box 12194
Washington, DC 20036-3209
United States

Junxing Chay

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Semra Ozdemir

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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