The Pursuit of Non-Trade Policy Objectives in EU Trade Policy

36 Pages Posted: 8 May 2020 Last revised: 14 May 2021

See all articles by Ingo Borchert

Ingo Borchert

University of Sussex

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Mattia Di Ubaldo

Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI)

Cristina Herghelegiu

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2020

Abstract

The European Union (EU) often conditions preferential access to its market on compliance with Non-Trade Policy Objectives (NTPOs), including human rights and labor and environmental standards. In this paper, we first systematically document the coverage of NTPOs across the main tools of EU trade policy: its (association and non-association) trade agreements and Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs. We then discuss the extent to which the EU can use these tools as a "carrot-and-stick" mechanism to promote NTPOs in trading partners. We argue that, within trade agreements, the EU has limited scope to extend or restrict tariff preferences to "reward good behavior" or "punish bad behavior" on NTPOs, partly because multilateral rules require members to eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade. By contrast, GSP preferences are granted on a unilateral basis, and can thus more easily be extended or limited, depending on compliance with NTPOs. Our analysis also suggests that the commercial interests of the EU inhibit the full pursuit of NTPOs in its trade agreements and GSP programs.

Suggested Citation

Borchert, Ingo and Conconi, Paola and Di Ubaldo, Mattia and Herghelegiu, Cristina, The Pursuit of Non-Trade Policy Objectives in EU Trade Policy (April 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14655, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3594287

Ingo Borchert (Contact Author)

University of Sussex

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 2 650 2345 (Phone)
32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Mattia Di Ubaldo

Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) ( email )

Whitaker square Sir john Rogerson's Quay
Dublin 2
Dublin
Ireland

Cristina Herghelegiu

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, IL 75005
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
409
PlumX Metrics