Ordinal Centrality

26 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2020 Last revised: 22 Oct 2020

See all articles by Evan Sadler

Evan Sadler

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics

Date Written: May 6, 2020

Abstract

Centrality measures play a key role in network analysis. This paper studies the extent to which these measures share a common structure. In contrast with prior work, I take an ordinal approach, considering preorders on the vertex set of a graph that satisfy an intuitive axiom called recursive monotonicity. From this axiom, I derive two fundamental measures, strong centrality and weak centrality, and I relate these measures to the equilibria of network games. Any equilibrium in a network game of strategic complements induces an order on the players based on who takes higher actions. I show that strong centrality exactly captures the comparisons that are shared across all equilibria in all such games. I show that weak centrality captures those comparisons that are shared across the minimal and maximal equilibria in all such games.

Keywords: Centrality, networks, ordinal

JEL Classification: D85

Suggested Citation

Sadler, Evan, Ordinal Centrality (May 6, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3594819 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3594819

Evan Sadler (Contact Author)

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

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New York, NY 10027
United States

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