U.S. Antitrust Policy in the Age of Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Netflix and Facebook

33 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2020

Date Written: April 17, 2020

Abstract

Are U.S. digital markets advancing, or threatening, the American economy? There is keen interest in the answer to this question. Sweeping changes have disrupted society courtesy of the Information Revolution, presenting great opportunities in radically transformed economic markets but also great challenges in adapting to new and different forms of organization. Great hope accompanies the former, much concern attends the latter. Now important discussions are engaging as to the impacts of market power, where competitive forces – beneficial in discovering new efficiencies and promoting Consumer Welfare – may be thwarted. Antitrust laws and other elements of competition policy are being re-examined. This paper attempts to inform the answers to these questions by examining industrial concentration in the information economy and its impact on U.S. market competition; vertical integration in digital platforms; forces driving innovation in business models and product markets; and the use of competition policy tools in high tech markets. These latter include broadband access and mobile phone industries, which have attracted attention as specific examples of areas where the U.S. has is seen by some as lagging rival economies due to insufficient antitrust enforcement.

Keywords: Antitrust Policy, Innovation, Industrial Concentration, Big Tech

JEL Classification: K21, K23, L4, L5

Suggested Citation

Hazlett, Thomas W., U.S. Antitrust Policy in the Age of Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Netflix and Facebook (April 17, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3594934 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3594934

Thomas W. Hazlett (Contact Author)

Clemson University ( email )

Clemson, SC 29634
United States
8646563430 (Phone)
8646564192 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://hazlett.people.clemson.edu/

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