The Impact of Repeated Notifications and Notification Checking Mode on Investors’ Reactions to Managers’ Strategic Title Emphasis

46 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2020 Last revised: 8 Jun 2021

See all articles by Wei Chen

Wei Chen

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Accounting

Hun-Tong Tan

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University

Elaine Wang

University of Massachusetts Amherst

Date Written: May 20, 2021

Abstract

We conduct an experiment to examine how repeated exposure to earnings notifications and the mode in which investors check notifications affect investors’ reactions to managers’ strategic positive emphasis in the title of an earnings release. We find that a title with (versus without) a positive emphasis leads to a favorable judgment when investors receive repeated notifications in a one-by-one mode. However, when investors receive a notification for the first time, or when investors receive repeated notifications in an all-at-once mode, we do not find a strategic positive title emphasis influences investor judgment. Overall, our results suggest that a strategic positive title emphasis could have different impacts on investor judgment depending on the frequency and mode in which investors receive earnings notifications.

Keywords: repeated exposure, notification checking mode, title, strategic emphasis, information processing

JEL Classification: C91, C92, G14, M41

Suggested Citation

Chen, Wei and Tan, Hun-Tong and Wang, Elaine (Ying), The Impact of Repeated Notifications and Notification Checking Mode on Investors’ Reactions to Managers’ Strategic Title Emphasis (May 20, 2021). Nanyang Business School Research Paper No. 20-09, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3594940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3594940

Wei Chen

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Accounting ( email )

Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Hun-Tong Tan (Contact Author)

Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University ( email )

Singapore, 639798
Singapore
+65 6790 4819 (Phone)
+65 6793 7956 (Fax)

Elaine (Ying) Wang

University of Massachusetts Amherst ( email )

Amherst, MA 01003-4910
United States
413-545-7613 (Phone)

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