Economic Democracy and Market Power

Antitrust Chronicle (April 2020), Competition Policy International

7 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2020

See all articles by Zoë Hitzig

Zoë Hitzig

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Michelle Meagher

University College London - Centre for Law, Economics and Society

Andre Veiga

Imperial College London

E. Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects; Plurality Institute; GETTING-Plurality Research Network

Date Written: April 21, 2020

Abstract

The original motivations of antitrust suggest an alternative remedy for market power: changes to corporate governance to include stakeholders who are subject to this power. In contrast to structural and behavioral remedies, “stakeholder remedies,” as we call them, have several desirable features. Stakeholder remedies allow corporations to harness benefits of scale while blocking their ability to exploit market power and avoiding cumbersome direct regulation by nation states. Thus, such remedies have the potential to resolve the key tensions in existing competition policy, and could stimulate a new inclusive democratic paradigm for corporate governance.

Keywords: antitrust, corporate governance, stakeholder capitalism, economies of scale, antitrust remedies, competition law, competition policy, economic democracy

Suggested Citation

Hitzig, Zoë and Meagher, Michelle and Veiga, Andre and Weyl, Eric Glen, Economic Democracy and Market Power (April 21, 2020). Antitrust Chronicle (April 2020), Competition Policy International, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3595066

Zoë Hitzig

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Michelle Meagher (Contact Author)

University College London - Centre for Law, Economics and Society ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Andre Veiga

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Eric Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects ( email )

11 Ellsworth Ave, #2
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
8579984513 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com

Plurality Institute ( email )

GETTING-Plurality Research Network ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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