Old and Young Politicians

39 Pages Posted: 8 May 2020

See all articles by Alberto Alesina

Alberto Alesina

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Traviss Cassidy

University of Alabama

Ugo Troiano

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 2019

Abstract

We consider the role of a politician's age in Italian municipal governments. When the term limit is not binding, younger mayors engage in political budget cycles more often than older mayors. Thus younger politicians behave more strategically in response to electoral incentives, probably because they expect to have a longer political career and stronger career concerns. We discuss and rule out several alternative interpretations.

Suggested Citation

Alesina, Alberto and Cassidy, Traviss and Troiano, Ugo, Old and Young Politicians (October 2019). Economica, Vol. 86, Issue 344, pp. 689-727, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3595571 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12287

Alberto Alesina (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
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Traviss Cassidy

University of Alabama ( email )

P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Ugo Troiano

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics ( email )

611 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/umich.edu/troiano

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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United States

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