Antidumping Echoing

27 Pages Posted: 14 May 2020

See all articles by Chrysostomos Tabakis

Chrysostomos Tabakis

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics

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Date Written: April 2017

Abstract

This article documents that antidumping (AD) “echoing” (i.e., different countries sequentially imposing AD measures on the same product from the same exporter) is common practice among users of AD. We develop a dynamic game where two competing importers can impose AD measures on a third exporting country in one of two periods, if at all. Assuming that governments are politically motivated (favoring their import‐competing industry), AD echoing occurs only for intermediate values of a country's political‐economy parameter. This result is confirmed by our econometric analysis, demonstrating that countries' political‐economy‐driven AD actions are interdependent and should not be analyzed in isolation.

JEL Classification: F12, F13, F14

Suggested Citation

Tabakis, Chrysostomos and Zanardi, Maurizio, Antidumping Echoing (April 2017). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 55, Issue 2, pp. 655-681, 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3596346 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12369

Chrysostomos Tabakis (Contact Author)

KDI School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 184
Seoul, 130-868
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom

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