What's the Inside Scoop? Challenges in the Supply and Demand for Information about Job Attributes

59 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2020 Last revised: 24 Feb 2021

See all articles by Jason Sockin

Jason Sockin

University of Pennsylvania, School of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economics, Students

Aaron Sojourner

University of Minnesota; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: September 15, 2020

Abstract

Workers struggle to understand prospective jobs and employers. Glassdoor is an online platform that offers jobseekers information about prospective employers from other workers' volunteered reviews. Analyzing Glassdoor data reveals how jobseekers share and use this information. Jobseekers classify reviews of employers as more helpful if they contain more-negative information, but such information is relatively scarce. Volunteers supplying negative information are more likely to conceal aspects of their identity, degrading the supplied information's value. Concealment is more likely in reviews for smaller firms and from current employees, where retaliation risk is higher. While workers demand information about some workplace attributes more than others, supply and demand for such information is imbalanced. Finally, higher ratings increase firm labor supply, consistent with incentives to retaliate. Reputation institutions provide valuable but partial solutions to workers' information problems.

Keywords: Imperfect Information, Job Search, Job Satisfaction, Retaliation Risks

JEL Classification: J3, J28, D83, J62

Suggested Citation

Sockin, Jason and Sojourner, Aaron J., What's the Inside Scoop? Challenges in the Supply and Demand for Information about Job Attributes (September 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3596666 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3596666

Jason Sockin (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania, School of Arts & Sciences, Department of Economics, Students ( email )

160 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Aaron J. Sojourner

University of Minnesota ( email )

Carlson School of Management
321 19th Ave S, 3-300
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
6126249521 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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