Media, Fake News, and Debunking

13 Pages Posted: 17 May 2020

See all articles by Ngo Van Long

Ngo Van Long

McGill University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Martin Richardson

Australian National University (ANU) - Faculty of Economics & Commerce

Frank Stähler

University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics; University of Adelaide - School of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: September 2019

Abstract

We construct a modified Hotelling‐type model of two media providers, each of whom can issue fake and/or real news and each of whom can invest in the debunking of their rival’s fake news. The model assumes that consumers have an innate preference for one provider or the other and value real news. However, that valuation varies according to their bias favouring one provider or the other. We demonstrate a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which only one firm issues fake news and we show, in this setting, that increased polarisation of consumers (represented by a wider distribution) increases the prevalence of both fake news and debunking expenditures and is welfare‐reducing. We also show, inter alia, that a stronger preference by consumers for their preferred provider lowers both fake news and debunking. Finally, we compare monopoly and duopoly market structures in terms of ‘fake news’ provision and show that a public news provider can be welfare‐improving.

Suggested Citation

Van Long, Ngo and Richardson, Martin and Stähler, Frank, Media, Fake News, and Debunking (September 2019). Economic Record, Vol. 95, Issue 310, pp. 312-324, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3597586 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-4932.12487

Ngo Van Long (Contact Author)

McGill University - Department of Economics ( email )

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Martin Richardson

Australian National University (ANU) - Faculty of Economics & Commerce ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601
Australia

Frank Stähler

University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics ( email )

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D-72074 Tuebingen, 72074
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.frank-staehler.de

University of Adelaide - School of Economics ( email )

Adelaide SA, 5005
Australia

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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