Covid-19, Shelter-In Place Strategies and Tipping

15 Pages Posted: 12 May 2020 Last revised: 11 Feb 2024

See all articles by Zhihan Cui

Zhihan Cui

Columbia University

Geoffrey M. Heal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Howard Kunreuther

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center

Date Written: May 2020

Abstract

Social distancing via shelter-in-place strategies has emerged as the most effective way to combat Covid-19. In the United States, choices about such policies are made by individual states. Here we show that the policy choice made by one state influences the incentives that other states face to adopt similar policies: they can be viewed as strategic complements in a supermodular game. If they satisfy the condition of uniform strict increasing differences then following Heal and Kunreuther ([6]) we show that if enough states engage in social distancing, they will tip others to do the same and thus shift the Nash equilibrium with respect to the number of states engaging in social distancing.

Suggested Citation

Cui, Zhihan and Heal, Geoffrey M. and Kunreuther, Howard C. and Kunreuther, Howard C., Covid-19, Shelter-In Place Strategies and Tipping (May 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27124, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3597856

Zhihan Cui (Contact Author)

Columbia University

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Geoffrey M. Heal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-6459 (Phone)
212-316-9219 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/gheal/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Howard C. Kunreuther

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center ( email )

3819 Chestnut Street
Suite 130
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-4589 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
41
Abstract Views
390
PlumX Metrics