Political Corruption and Capture of the Minority

26 Pages Posted: 17 May 2020

See all articles by Pierpaolo Giannoccolo

Pierpaolo Giannoccolo

University of Bologna

Maurizio Lisciandra

University of Messina - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2019


This article presents a model of political corruption in which a briber can choose either to bribe only the incumbent party or to capture also the opposition party to sterilize its monitoring role. The analysis also explores interparty collusion, media independence, and political contestability. The model suggests that policies aiming to strengthen the role of minorities can produce ambiguous effects as they may induce bribers' avoidance behavior. Reputational sanctions appear to be less effective than criminal ones, although political contestability increases their deterrence effect. Paradoxically, harsh criminal sanctions may induce tacit collusion because minorities highly regard their outcomes once in power.

Keywords: antiā€corruption, bribing, hierarchies, political parties, voters

Suggested Citation

Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo and Lisciandra, Maurizio, Political Corruption and Capture of the Minority (November 2019). Economics & Politics, Vol. 31, Issue 3, pp. 485-510, 2019, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3598393 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12137

Pierpaolo Giannoccolo (Contact Author)

University of Bologna ( email )

Department of Economics
Piazza Scaravilli, 2
40125 Bologna, 40125

HOME PAGE: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/giannoccolo

Maurizio Lisciandra

University of Messina - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza Pugliatti 1
Messina, 98122
+39 (0)906764620 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/mlisciandra/

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