On the Instability of Banking and Other Financial Intermediation
51 Pages Posted: 15 May 2020
Date Written: May 8, 2020
Are financial intermediaries inherently unstable and, if so, why? To address this, we analyse whether model economies with financial intermediation are particularly prone to multiple, cyclic or stochastic equilibria. Several formalisations are considered: a dynamic version of Diamond-Dybvig banking incorporating reputational considerations; a model with fixed costs and delegated investment as in Diamond; one with bank liabilities serving as payment instruments similar to currency in Lagos-Wright; and one with intermediaries as dealers in decentralised asset markets, similar to Duffie et al. Although the economics and mathematics differ across specifications, in each case financial intermediation engenders instability in a precise sense.
Keywords: banking, financial intermediation, instability, volatility
JEL Classification: D02, E02, E44, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation