Analysts’ GAAP earnings forecast quality: Implications for research

58 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2020 Last revised: 3 Oct 2023

See all articles by Novia (Xi) Chen

Novia (Xi) Chen

University of Houston - Department of Accountancy & Taxation

Allison Koester

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business; Georgetown University - Department of Accounting and Business Law

Date Written: July 10, 2023

Abstract

We examine the quality of analysts’ GAAP earnings forecasts and consider implications of GAAP forecast quality for research. We first exploit a tax law change that generates an estimable and material impact on GAAP earnings but not on street earnings in 2017. Analysts generally fail to incorporate this event into their GAAP forecasts yet investors promptly respond to the event, indicating that GAAP forecasts are of low quality and not a good proxy for investor expectations in this setting. Next, using GAAP forecasts spanning 2004 through 2019, we find that low quality GAAP forecasts dampen researchers’ estimates of GAAP ERCs, increase the percentage of firm-quarters classified as meeting-or-beating via exclusions and dampen the market premium for meeting-or-beating, and understate researcher estimates of analysts’ incorporation of exclusions components into GAAP forecasts. We offer two simple empirical strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of low quality GAAP earnings forecasts on research inferences.

Keywords: GAAP earnings forecasts; GAAP earnings response coefficients; meet-or-beat behavior

JEL Classification: G14, M40, M41

Suggested Citation

Chen, Novia (Xi) and Koester, Allison, Analysts’ GAAP earnings forecast quality: Implications for research (July 10, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3599616 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3599616

Novia (Xi) Chen (Contact Author)

University of Houston - Department of Accountancy & Taxation ( email )

Bauer College of Business
4800 Calhoun Road
Houston, TX 77204
United States

Allison Koester

Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business ( email )

3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202.687.6461 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/apk29/

Georgetown University - Department of Accounting and Business Law ( email )

McDonough School of Business
Washington, DC 20057
United States

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