Trade Secrets Protection and Stock Price Crash Risk

Accepted, Financial Review

57 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2020 Last revised: 28 Oct 2022

See all articles by Dan Hu

Dan Hu

University of Massachusetts Lowell

Eunju Lee

University of Massachusetts Lowell

Bingxin Li

West Virginia University; West Virginia University - Department of Finance

Date Written: May 1, 2019

Abstract

This paper provides evidence that the effect of trade secrets protection increases stock price crash risk. Using a quasi-experimental setting with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), we find that firms headquartered in states adopting the UTSA tend to have higher stock price crash risk. The results are robust to controlling for other trade secrets laws and the choice of crash risk measures, and they are more pronounced in small firms and firms with high market-to-book and low leverage ratios. A detailed mechanism analysis reveals that increased crash risk for firms under the UTSA is attributed to higher information asymmetry, low reporting quality, and more negative news withheld following the UTSA. Overall, our results highlight that trade secrets protection leads to the unexpected, negative consequence of elevated stock price crash risk.

Keywords: Trade secrets protection; Uniform Trade Secrets Act; Stock price crash risk; Information asymmetry; Earnings response coefficient; Short interest

JEL Classification: G12, G14, D82

Suggested Citation

Hu, Dan and Lee, Eunju and Li, Bingxin, Trade Secrets Protection and Stock Price Crash Risk (May 1, 2019). Accepted, Financial Review, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3600610 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3600610

Dan Hu

University of Massachusetts Lowell ( email )

1 University Ave
Lowell, MA 01854
United States

Eunju Lee (Contact Author)

University of Massachusetts Lowell ( email )

1 University Ave
Lowell, MA 01854
United States
978-934-2520 (Phone)

Bingxin Li

West Virginia University ( email )

Chambers College of Business and Economics
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States
304-293-2777 (Phone)

West Virginia University - Department of Finance ( email )

Chambers College of Business and Economics
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States
304-293-2777 (Phone)

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