Do Women Always Behave As Corruption Cleaners?

Posted: 9 Jun 2020 Last revised: 17 Oct 2020

See all articles by Alice Guerra

Alice Guerra

University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Tatyana Zhuravleva

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: May 15, 2020

Abstract

We conduct an experiment to analyze the conditions under which individuals’ propensity to engage in bribery and tolerance towards corrupt actors differ across gender. We manipulate the key bribery dimensions — the benefits to corrupt actors and the negative externality caused to other people. We show that neither gender is uniformly more corruption prone/tolerant: it depends upon both the exact bribery conditions, their interaction, and the role taken in the bribe act. Females are less bribery prone/tolerant when externality to society increases (under low gains to corrupt actors)
and turns welfare-enhancing bribes into welfare reducing. Men punish corrupt actors more severely when the latter gain greater benefits (under high externality). Females’ behavior is consistent across roles when bribery yields a negative welfare shift — but, apart from that, gender behavior is strongly role-dependent. We also collect data on subjects’ anger towards corrupt actors, and show that gender differences in such feelings sync with differences in punishment.

Keywords: Gender; Bribery; Punishment; Anger; Lab Experiment

JEL Classification: D73; J16; D91; K42; C92

Suggested Citation

Guerra, Alice and Zhuravleva, Tatyana, Do Women Always Behave As Corruption Cleaners? (May 15, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3601696 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3601696

Alice Guerra (Contact Author)

University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )

Bologna
Italy

Tatyana Zhuravleva

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Soyza Pechatnikov str., 15
St. Petersburg, 190068
Russia

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