Models of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs in the United States and Beyond

Emory Legal Studies Research Paper 20-2

Annual Review of Criminology (Forthcoming)

44 Pages Posted: 29 May 2020 Last revised: 9 Jun 2020

See all articles by Kay Levine

Kay Levine

Emory University School of Law

Ronald F. Wright

Wake Forest University - School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 15, 2020

Abstract

Diversion programs allow criminal justice actors to send defendants out of the court system, compelling them instead to attend treatment programs or perform community service. While some diversion programs are administered within the court system, prosecutors design and operate a substantial number of these programs themselves. Because the prosecutor does not need to obtain input from judges or other actors in these programs, they carry higher risks of performance problems, such as net widening and unequal application of program criteria. Moreover, because of the local focus of most prosecutors’ offices in the United States, their diversion programs differ from place to place. The published program evaluations are too often site-specific, offering few general insights about this category of programs. The fragmented literature about prosecutor-led diversion programs should expand the metrics of success for these programs and monitor the effects of the prosecutor-dominated governance structure.

Keywords: Diversion, net widening, recidivism, cost savings, pretrial services

Suggested Citation

Levine, Kay and Wright, Ronald F., Models of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs in the United States and Beyond (May 15, 2020). Emory Legal Studies Research Paper 20-2, Annual Review of Criminology (Forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3601930 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3601930

Kay Levine (Contact Author)

Emory University School of Law ( email )

1301 Clifton Road
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

Ronald F. Wright

Wake Forest University - School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States
336-758-5727 (Phone)
336-758-4496 (Fax)

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