An Experimental Investigation of Cooperation in the Dynamic Common Pool Game

24 Pages Posted: 22 May 2020

See all articles by Emanuel Vespa

Emanuel Vespa

UC Santa Barbara - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 2020

Abstract

This article studies experimentally to what extent subjects can cooperate in a dynamic common pool game, where the stage game changes endogenously. Although efficiency can be supported with strategies that condition on history, the main finding is that it is difficult to cooperate. Even if the incentives to cooperate are large, modal behavior can be rationalized with equilibrium Markov strategies that do not condition on history. The popularity of Markov strategies, however, is decreasing in the incentives to cooperate. The evidence also suggests that strategic uncertainty added by facing stage games that change in time may move play away from efficiency.

Suggested Citation

Vespa, Emanuel, An Experimental Investigation of Cooperation in the Dynamic Common Pool Game (February 2020). International Economic Review, Vol. 61, Issue 1, pp. 417-440, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3602128 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12428

Emanuel Vespa (Contact Author)

UC Santa Barbara - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall University of California
Santa Barbara, CA 93117
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/emanuelvespa/

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