Institutional Bargaining for Democratic Theorists (or How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Haggling)

Posted: 17 May 2020

See all articles by Jack Knight

Jack Knight

Duke University School of Law

Melissa Schwartzberg

Columbia University; New York University (NYU) - Department of Politics

Date Written: May 2020

Abstract

Contemporary political science takes bargaining to be the central mechanism of democratic decision making, though political theorists typically doubt that processes that permit the exercise of unequal power and the use of threats can yield legitimate outcomes. In this review, we trace the development of theories of institutional bargaining from the standpoint of pluralism and positive political theory before turning to the treatment of bargaining in the influential work of John Rawls and J├╝rgen Habermas. Their ambivalence about bargaining gave rise to a new focus on the value of negotiation and compromise but this literature constitutes an unstable midpoint between the justificatory ambitions of deliberative democracy and the desire to provide plausible models of political decision making. Instead of advocating changes in mindset or motivation, we argue that a fair bargaining process requires institutional reform, as well as a justificatory framework centered on the preservation of egalitarian decision making.

Suggested Citation

Knight, Jack and Schwartzberg, Melissa, Institutional Bargaining for Democratic Theorists (or How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Haggling) (May 2020). Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 23, pp. 259-276, 2020, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3602500 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060118-102113

Jack Knight

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Melissa Schwartzberg (Contact Author)

Columbia University

420 W. 118th St.
International Affairs Building, 7th fl.
New York, NY 10027
United States

New York University (NYU) - Department of Politics ( email )

New York, NY
United States

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