Information Technology and Credit: Evidence from Public Guarantees

Management Science, Forthcoming

57 Pages Posted: 19 May 2020 Last revised: 6 Mar 2023

See all articles by Fabrizio Core

Fabrizio Core

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Business and Management

Filippo De Marco

Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research; CEPR Financial Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 28, 2023

Abstract

This paper investigates whether banks' information technology (IT) can substitute for local branch presence in the provision of small business credit. Our identification strategy relies on loan-level data and the unique institutional features of the Italian public guarantee scheme during Covid-19. Despite the availability of online applications and low screening incentives, small business lending remains local, even for first-time borrowers. However, IT partly mitigates the impact of local branch presence: banks with better IT provide more, cheaper and faster guaranteed loans and lend more in areas where they have no bank branches, especially to first-time borrowers.

Keywords: public guarantees, COVID-19, information technology, lending relationships

JEL Classification: G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Core, Fabrizio and De Marco, Filippo, Information Technology and Credit: Evidence from Public Guarantees (February 28, 2023). Management Science, Forthcoming , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604114 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3604114

Fabrizio Core

Luiss Guido Carli University - Department of Business and Management ( email )

Viale Romania 32
Roma, RM 00197
Italy

Filippo De Marco (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )

Department of Finance
Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

CEPR Financial Economics ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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