Equilibrium Non-Existence in Generalized Games

14 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2020

Date Written: May 18, 2020


A generalized game is a strategic situation in which agents’ behavior restricts their opponents’ available action choices, giving rise to interdependencies in terms of what strategy profiles remain mutually feasible. This paper proposes a novel example of a simple generalized game in which the well-known convexity, compactness, continuity, and concavity assumptions are satisfied, but no Nash equilibrium exists. This finding reinforces that certain additional conditions appearing in the literature (primarily, the lower hemicontinuity of feasibility correspondences) are indispensable for equilibrium existence and must be considered as supplemental desiderata beyond the usual regularity conditions. Implications for institutional design are discussed.

Keywords: generalized games, Nash equilibrium, existence

JEL Classification: C62, C72

Suggested Citation

Tóbiás, Áron, Equilibrium Non-Existence in Generalized Games (May 18, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604667 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3604667

Áron Tóbiás (Contact Author)

Syracuse University ( email )

110 Eggers Hall
Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY 13244-1020
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.arontobias.com

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