Estimating the Wage Premium to Supervision for Middle Managers in Different Contexts: Evidence from Germany and the UK

Work Employment and Society, First Published May 4, DOI:10.1177/0950017020902983

50 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2020

See all articles by Leone Leonida

Leone Leonida

King's College London - King's Business School

Marianna Marra

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Sergio Scicchitano

Istituto Nazionale per l’Analisi delle Politiche Pubbliche (INAPP); Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Antonio Giangreco

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management

Marco Biagetti

Government of the Italian Republic (Italy) - Agency for Territorial Cohesion

Date Written: May 19, 2020

Abstract

The analysis of wage distribution has attracted scholars from different disciplines seeking to develop theoretical arguments to explain the upward or downward trend. In particular, how the middle management wage premium changes in different contexts is a relatively neglected area of research. This study argues that wage distribution changes in different contexts, representing different forms of capitalism. To shed light on this, we considered the size and the shape of the wage premium to supervision paid to middle managers in Germany and the UK. We find evidence of two forms of context: middle managers are paid differently for the same task according to the economy where they work; of this amount, about half of the difference is related to the context. We frame the analysis within the literature on varieties of capitalism.

Keywords: context, Germany, middle managers, UK, variety of capitalism, wage premium

Suggested Citation

Leonida, Leone and Marra, Marianna and Scicchitano, Sergio and Giangreco, Antonio and Biagetti, Marco, Estimating the Wage Premium to Supervision for Middle Managers in Different Contexts: Evidence from Germany and the UK (May 19, 2020). Work Employment and Society, First Published May 4, DOI:10.1177/0950017020902983, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3604972

Leone Leonida

King's College London - King's Business School ( email )

150 Stamford Street
London, SE1 9NH
United Kingdom

Marianna Marra

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Sergio Scicchitano (Contact Author)

Istituto Nazionale per l’Analisi delle Politiche Pubbliche (INAPP) ( email )

Corso d’Italia, 33
Roma, 00198
Italy

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Collogne
Germany

Antonio Giangreco

Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management ( email )

3 Rue de la Digue
Office: A321
Puteaux, 92800
France

Marco Biagetti

Government of the Italian Republic (Italy) - Agency for Territorial Cohesion ( email )

Via Sicilia, 162C
ROME
Italy

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