Slowdown Antitrust Investigations by Decentralization

30 Pages Posted: 15 Jun 2020

See all articles by Emilie Dargaud

Emilie Dargaud

University of Lyon 2

Armel Jacques

Université de la Réunion

Date Written: May 20, 2020

Abstract

When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. Doing so results in slowdown antitrust investigations and decentralized firm can easily request leniency for a second cartel after the detection of an other. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects.

Keywords: Collusion, antitrust policy, leniency programs, multimarket contact, organizational form

JEL Classification: K42, L22, L41

Suggested Citation

Dargaud, Emilie and Jacques, Armel, Slowdown Antitrust Investigations by Decentralization (May 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3606082 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3606082

Emilie Dargaud (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 ( email )

France

Armel Jacques

Université de la Réunion ( email )

Campus du Moufia
15, avenue Rene Cassin BP 7151 -97 715
Saint-Denis messag cedex 9
France

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