The dynamics of preemptive and follower investments with overlapping ownership
48 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2020 Last revised: 27 Jan 2021
Date Written: January 20, 2021
We study how overlapping ownership affects investments in a preemption race with market uncertainty. Internalization of rival payoffs delays follower entry if product market effects are moderate, implying longer incumbency which intensifies dynamic competition. Preemptive and follower investment thresholds increase with volatility as in standard real option models whereas firm value can decrease, and greater volatility makes internalization more profitable. From a welfare perspective there is a tradeoff between dynamic benefit and static costs of overlapping ownership. Whereas it is socially optimal not to have any overlapping ownership in some markets, at low volatility levels we find firms have an insufficient incentive to internalize.
Keywords: common ownership, dynamic competition, real options
JEL Classification: C73, G32
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