What Explains Temporal and Geographic Variation in the Early US COVID-19 Pandemic?

46 Pages Posted: 27 May 2020 Last revised: 28 Nov 2024

See all articles by Hunt Allcott

Hunt Allcott

Microsoft Corporation - Microsoft Research New England

Levi Boxell

Independent

Jacob Conway

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Billy Ferguson

Stanford University

Matthew Gentzkow

Stanford University

Benjamin Goldman

Cornell University; Harvard University

Date Written: November 27, 2024

Abstract

We provide new evidence on the drivers of the early US COVID-19 pandemic and develop a methodology that future researchers can use to similarly analyze the outbreaks of new diseases. We combine an epidemiological model of disease transmission with quasi-random variation arising from the timing of stay-at-home-orders to estimate the causal roles of policy interventions and voluntary social distancing. We then relate the residual variation in disease transmission rates to observable features of cities. We estimate significant impacts of policy and social distancing responses, but we show that the magnitude of policy effects was modest, and most social distancing was driven by voluntary responses. Moreover, we show that neither policy nor rates of voluntary social distancing explained a meaningful share of geographic variation. The most important predictors of which cities were hardest hit by the pandemic were exogenous characteristics such as population and density.

Keywords: Coronavirus, Public policy, Health behaviors, Disease transmission

JEL Classification: H12, H75, I12, I18

Suggested Citation

Allcott, Hunt and Boxell, Levi and Conway, Jacob and Ferguson, Billy and Gentzkow, Matthew and Goldman, Benjamin, What Explains Temporal and Geographic Variation in the Early US COVID-19 Pandemic? (November 27, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3610422 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3610422

Hunt Allcott

Microsoft Corporation - Microsoft Research New England ( email )

One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

Levi Boxell

Independent ( email )

Jacob Conway (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Billy Ferguson

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA
United States

Matthew Gentzkow

Stanford University ( email )

Benjamin Goldman

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Harvard University ( email )

Byerly Hall
8 Garden Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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