Download This PaperDoes Bundling Induce Adverse Selection in Insurance?
16 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2020 Last revised: 20 Jul 2020
Date Written: April 9, 2020
Abstract
Bundling credit with insurance contracts is a common approach to increasing insurance take-up, especially in low income-environments. I document that this approach can induce adverse selection in insurance; thus, acting as an important source of inefficiency.
Keywords: Adverse Selection, Insurance, Credit, Bundling, Regulation
JEL Classification: D82, G22, O12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Annan, Francis, Does Bundling Induce Adverse Selection in Insurance? (April 9, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3611230 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3611230
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