Punishment and Grace: On the Economics of Permanent Amnesties

Public Finance/Finances Publiques, vol. 3, 1996, pp. 353-368

18 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2020

Date Written: April 18, 1996

Abstract

This paper extends the literature on tax amnesties by considering two special grace programmes. The first is an offer by the government not to investigate taxpayers' accounts, the second not to prosecute indicted evaders. I analyse the impact of both measures on the taxpayers' optimal behavior and the government's net revenue, and derive the conditions under which it would be desirable to implement them on a permanent basis.

Keywords: tax evasion, tax amnesty

JEL Classification: H26, K42

Suggested Citation

Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, Punishment and Grace: On the Economics of Permanent Amnesties (April 18, 1996). Public Finance/Finances Publiques, vol. 3, 1996, pp. 353-368, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3611567 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3611567

Luigi Alberto Franzoni (Contact Author)

University of Bologna ( email )

P.zza Scaravilli 2
Bologna, 40124
Italy
0512098488 (Phone)
+39-051-221968 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: https://www.unibo.it/sitoweb/luigi.franzoni/en

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