Effective Resource Management of Governments and Corruption

59 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2020

See all articles by Cheol Liu

Cheol Liu

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

Jekyung Lee

University of Georgia

Date Written: May 28, 2020

Abstract

This paper shows theoretically and empirically that public officials’ corruption is likely to degrade the quality of government management practices. By shedding light inside the classic “black box” idea of management, we explain how public corruption exerts a bad influence upon leadership, use of information and resource allocation. This bad influence of public corruption, as a consequence, will deteriorate the overall management quality of governments by weakening the integration of management subsystems. Data support our arguments by showing that increase in public corruption in an American state government decreases the probability significantly that the state may maintain its management excellence. The paper also demonstrates that infrastructure management of state governments is most vulnerable to corruption. Two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS-IV) regressions support the robustness of our model and the empirical results.

Suggested Citation

Liu, Cheol and Lee, Jekyung, Effective Resource Management of Governments and Corruption (May 28, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3612522 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3612522

Cheol Liu (Contact Author)

KDI School of Public Policy and Management ( email )

263 Namsejong-ro
Sejong-si 30149
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Jekyung Lee

University of Georgia

Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States

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