Demand for Safety, Risky Loans: A Model of Securitization

73 Pages Posted: 28 May 2020

See all articles by Anatoli Segura

Anatoli Segura

Bank of Italy

Alonso Villacorta

Stanford University; UC Santa Cruz

Date Written: February 12, 2020


We build a competitive equilibrium model of securitization in the presence of demand for safety by some investors. Securitization allows to create safe assets by pooling idiosyncratic risks from loan originators, leading to higher aggregate loan issuance. Yet, the distribution of loan risks out of their originators creates a moral hazard problem. An increase in the demand for safety leads to a securitization boom and riskier originated loans. When demand for safety is high, welfare is Pareto higher than in an economy with no securitization despite the origination of riskier loans. Aggregate lending expansions driven by demand for safety may, paradoxically, lead to riskier loan issuance than expansions driven by standard credit supply shocks.

Keywords: securitization, originate-to-distribute, safety demand, diversification, moral hazard

JEL Classification: G01, G20, G28

Suggested Citation

Segura, Anatoli and Villacorta, Luis Alonso and Villacorta, Luis Alonso, Demand for Safety, Risky Loans: A Model of Securitization (February 12, 2020). Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 1260, Available at SSRN: or

Anatoli Segura (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184

Luis Alonso Villacorta

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

UC Santa Cruz ( email )

Santa Cruz, CA 95064
United States

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