# AP On I J Good’s Inability to Grasp Keynes’s Complete Analysis of the Weight of the Argument: The Logical Part of the Analysis of Evidential Weight of the Argument in Chapter 6 and the Mathematical Part of the Analysis in Chapter 26 in the A Treatise On Probability

22 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2020

Date Written: May 31, 2020

### Abstract

The mis-belief that Keynes ‘s concept of the evidential weight of the evidence ,V=V(a/h),in chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, represented a measure of the absolute amount of relevant evidence ,can be traced back to some 40 book and journal contributions made by I J Good between 1950 and 1990.Good completely overlooked Keynes’s footnote 1 on page 76 of chapter 6 to chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability,where Keynes stated that he would discuss how to integrate weight into a discussion of “…the application of probability to practice.” This would require a mathematical analysis and ,obviously, would require the restriction that V(a/h)=w, 0≤w≤1,so as to combine it with 0≤α≤1,where P(a/h)=α.

The most severe errors about chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability were originally introduced by I J Good starting in 1950 .His repeated errors appeared in all of his work on Keynes after that for the next 40 years.These errors were then picked up by economists and philosophers and made the foundation of their assessments of Keynes’s work starting in 1990 with a paper by Runde.It is quite impossible to add ,subtract ,divide ,and multiply logical relations like P and V. This obvious fact has gone unrecognized in the literature.

**Keywords:** Good, Absolute Measure, Relative Measure,, V(a/H) =W, V(a/H) Can’t Equal K, Chapter 6, Chapter 26, Expectation

**JEL Classification:** B10, B12, B14, B16, B18, B20, B22

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