Framing, Information, and Welfare

45 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2020

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2020

Abstract

Consumers often face an overwhelming amount of information when deciding between products, and one of the primary policymaking tools available to improve their informativeness is the framing of this information. We introduce a general theoretical approach that characterizes when one frame is revealed to provide robustly higher welfare than another. Because it is testable, adaptable, and both necessary and sufficient, our condition determines both whether frames are robustly welfare ranked in a particular data set and the overall proportion of data sets in which frames can be so ranked.

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Suggested Citation

Caplin, Andrew and Martin, Daniel, Framing, Information, and Welfare (May 2020). NBER Working Paper No. w27265, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3615461

Andrew Caplin (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/caplina/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Daniel Martin

Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS) ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

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