Asocial Capital: Civic Culture and Social Distancing During Covid-19

40 Pages Posted: 3 Jun 2020 Last revised: 23 Dec 2020

See all articles by Ruben Durante

Ruben Durante

National University Singapore; Barcelona School of Economics; IZA; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luigi Guiso

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Giorgio Gulino

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Students

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Date Written: May 2020

Abstract

Social distancing can slow the spread of COVID-19 if citizens comply with it and internalize the cost of their mobility on others. We study how civic values mediate this process using data on mobility across Italian provinces between January and May 2020. We find that after the virus outbreak mobility declined, but significantly more in areas with higher civic capital, both before and after a mandatory national lockdown. The effect is not driven by differences in the risk of contagion, health-care capacity, geographic socioeconomic and demographic factors, or by a general North-South divide. Simulating a SIR model calibrated on Italy, we estimate that if all provinces had the same civic capital as those in top-quartile, COVID-related deaths would have been about 60% lower. We find consistent results for Germany where the incidence of the pandemic and restrictions to mobility were milder.

JEL Classification: D91, Z1

Suggested Citation

Durante, Ruben and Guiso, Luigi and Gulino, Giorgio, Asocial Capital: Civic Culture and Social Distancing During Covid-19 (May 2020). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14820, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3615583

Ruben Durante (Contact Author)

National University Singapore ( email )

HOME PAGE: http://www.rubendurante.net

Barcelona School of Economics ( email )

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Spain

IZA ( email )

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Luigi Guiso

Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) ( email )

Giorgio Gulino

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Students ( email )

Barcelona
Spain

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