Disputes in International Investment and Trade

69 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2020 Last revised: 3 Jun 2020

See all articles by Ralph Ossa

Ralph Ossa

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Robert W. Staiger

Stanford University; University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Alan Sykes

Stanford University - Law School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 1, 2020

Abstract

International investment agreements employ dispute settlement procedures that differ markedly from their counterparts in trade agreements along three key dimensions: standing (i.e., the right to file grievances), the nature of the remedy, and the remedial period. In the state-to-state dispute settlement procedures of a typical trade agreement, only governments have standing, while private investors also have standing in the investor-state dispute settlement procedures employed by investment agreements. Trade agreements typically employ tariff retaliation as the remedy for violation of the agreement, while the award of cash damages is the norm in investment disputes. And trade agreements typically provide for only prospective remedies covering harm done subsequent to a ruling, while the damages awarded in investment disputes routinely cover past as well as future harms. We develop parallel models of trade agreements and investment agreements and employ them to study these differences. We argue that the differences can be understood as arising from the fundamentally different problems that trade and investment agreements are designed to solve.

Suggested Citation

Ossa, Ralph and Staiger, Robert W. and Sykes, Alan, Disputes in International Investment and Trade (April 1, 2020). Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 553, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617016 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3617016

Ralph Ossa (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Z├╝rich
Switzerland

Robert W. Staiger

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Economics ( email )

1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706
United States
608-262-2265 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Alan Sykes

Stanford University - Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
20
Abstract Views
80
PlumX Metrics