Trading Quasi-Emission Permits
41 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2003
Date Written: January 31, 2002
Abstract
I study the design of environmental policies for a regulator that has incomplete information on firms' emissions and costs of production and abatement (e.g., air pollution in cities with numerous small polluting sources). Because of incomplete information on emissions, there is no policy that can implement the first-best. Since the regulator can observe firms' abatement technologies, however, it is possible to design a quasi-emissions trading program based on this information and show that it can provide higher welfare than command-and-control regulation such as technology or emission standards. I then empirically examine this claim using evidence from a particulate quasi-emissions trading program in Santiago, Chile.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Can Taxes on Cars and on Gasoline Mimic an Unavailable Tax on Emissions?
By Don Fullerton and Sarah E. West
-
Tax and Subsidy Combinations for the Control of Car Pollution
By Don Fullerton and Sarah E. West
-
Vehicle Choices, Miles Driven, and Pollution Policies
By Ye Feng, Don Fullerton, ...
-
Suggested Subsidies are Sub-Optimal Unless Combined with an Output Tax
By Don Fullerton and Robert D. Mohr
-
Cost-Effective Policies to Reduce Vehicle Emissions
By Don Fullerton and Li Gan
-
Urban Transport Policies: The Dutch Struggle with Market Failures and Policy Failures
-
Urban Transport Policies: The Dutch Struggle with Market Failures and Policy Failures
-
Consumption Pattern, Income Distribution and the Environment in Brazil
-
Paying for Climate Change Policies in Europe
By Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi