The Influence on Resale Prices of Labor– Management Disputes in Aircraft Manufacturing .

Labor and Employment Relations Association Proceedings, 2014

5 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2020

See all articles by Morris M. Kleiner

Morris M. Kleiner

Humphrey School of Public Affairs; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jonathan S. Leonard

University of California, Berkeley - Finance Group; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Adam M. Pilarski

AVITAS, Inc.

Date Written: August 1, 2014

Abstract

Aircraft are manufactured with unusual attention to quality control. The.product common in this industry limits the potential for Lordstown-style disgruntled employee sabotage documented in the auto industry. A loose bolt that rattles inside an automobile’s door frame is of a different magnitude than one that threatens the integrity of an aircraft. On top of the incentives to build quality in, aircraft are manufactured under multiple overlapping levels of quality control: by the manufacturer, by the buyer, and by the Federal Aviation Administration. This oversight extends from design to parts to assembly to maintenance. Both the market incentives and the extensive regulatory oversight limit the scope for labor disputes to affect quality.

Keywords: Labor Management Disputes, Collective Bargaining,Product Quality

JEL Classification: J50, J51, J52, L25

Suggested Citation

Kleiner, Morris M. and Leonard, Jonathan S. and Pilarski, Adam M., The Influence on Resale Prices of Labor– Management Disputes in Aircraft Manufacturing . (August 1, 2014). Labor and Employment Relations Association Proceedings, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617326 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3617326

Morris M. Kleiner (Contact Author)

Humphrey School of Public Affairs ( email )

Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-625-2089 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jonathan S. Leonard

University of California, Berkeley - Finance Group ( email )

Haas School of Business
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-7048 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Adam M. Pilarski

AVITAS, Inc. ( email )

1835 Alexander Bell Drive
Suite 200
Reston, VA 20191
United States

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