Corruption and Within-Country Stereotypes

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See all articles by Paolo Buonanno

Paolo Buonanno

University of Bergamo

Marcello Puca

University of Bergamo; Webster University - Webster University Geneva

Patrizia Sbriglia

University of Campania - LUIGI VANVITELLI

Date Written: June 3, 2020

Abstract

We conduct a hybrid experimental-observational study on college students to investigate whether the exposure to institutions of significantly heterogeneous quality affects their behavior and their stereotypes about others' behavior in a corruption experiment. The 2x2 between-subject experimental design varies: (i) the availability of information on the geographic origin of the participants; and (ii) whether participants are matched with others from the same macro-region. Experimental results show that (i) knowing the other’s region of origin significantly increases the probability of engaging in corruption, but mostly when briber and bribee belong to different macro-regions; (ii) coming from municipalities with a lower contemporary and historical level of civic capital significantly increases the probability of engaging in corruption. Our findings suggest that the quality of institutions has a persistent effect on an individuals' internalized prosocial norms, and that these effects are evident even in a highly controlled laboratory setting.

Keywords: Corruption, Institutions, Social Capital, Diversity.

JEL Classification: A14, C91, D73, Z13

Suggested Citation

Buonanno, Paolo and Puca, Marcello and Sbriglia, Patrizia, Corruption and Within-Country Stereotypes (June 3, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=

Marcello Puca

University of Bergamo ( email )

Via dei Caniana 2
Bergamo, 24127
Italy

Webster University - Webster University Geneva ( email )

Route de Collex 15
Bellevue, CH- 1293
Switzerland

Patrizia Sbriglia

University of Campania - LUIGI VANVITELLI ( email )

Gran Priorato di Malta
Caserta CE, Caserta 83100
Italy

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