Virtue Signaling: A Theory of Message Legislation

36 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2020

See all articles by Daniel Gibbs

Daniel Gibbs

Princeton University, Department of Politics, Students

Charles M. Cameron

Princeton University - Department of Political Science; Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs

Date Written: June 3, 2020

Abstract

We present a theory of message legislation, legislative enactments not intended to alter policy but instead constructed to send a message to constituents. Using a formal model, we identify conditions under which legislators knowingly introduce non-viable legislation in order to signal their congruence with voters' policy preferences. We find message legislation to be most prevalent when legislation is highly visible, voters strongly disfavor the status quo, incumbent legislators face a strong primary challenger, the probability that viable legislation can be passed in the future is high, and the opportunity cost of producing non-viable legislation is low. We further show that message legislation, while seemingly wasteful, provides voters with valuable information to select candidates who better represent their interests. However, this selection benefit comes at the cost of the quality of future legislation if messaging diverts legislative attention away from preparing a substantive replacement of the status quo in the future.

Keywords: legislatures, accountability, signaling, elections

JEL Classification: D71, D72

Suggested Citation

Gibbs, Daniel and Cameron, Charles M., Virtue Signaling: A Theory of Message Legislation (June 3, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3617960 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3617960

Daniel Gibbs (Contact Author)

Princeton University, Department of Politics, Students

Fisher Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States

Charles M. Cameron

Princeton University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Corwin Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
United States

Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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