Virtue Signaling: A Theory of Message Legislation
36 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2020
Date Written: June 3, 2020
Abstract
We present a theory of message legislation, legislative enactments not intended to alter policy but instead constructed to send a message to constituents. Using a formal model, we identify conditions under which legislators knowingly introduce non-viable legislation in order to signal their congruence with voters' policy preferences. We find message legislation to be most prevalent when legislation is highly visible, voters strongly disfavor the status quo, incumbent legislators face a strong primary challenger, the probability that viable legislation can be passed in the future is high, and the opportunity cost of producing non-viable legislation is low. We further show that message legislation, while seemingly wasteful, provides voters with valuable information to select candidates who better represent their interests. However, this selection benefit comes at the cost of the quality of future legislation if messaging diverts legislative attention away from preparing a substantive replacement of the status quo in the future.
Keywords: legislatures, accountability, signaling, elections
JEL Classification: D71, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation