Institutions, Opportunism and Prosocial Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence

34 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2020

See all articles by Antonio Cabrales

Antonio Cabrales

University College London - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Charles III University of Madrid

Irma Clots-Figueras

University of Kent

Roberto Hernán-González

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Praveen Kujal

Middlesex University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2020

Abstract

Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions. Whether voted or purchased, we find that there is demand for institutions in low trustworthiness groups, while high trustworthiness groups always demand lower levels of institutions. Lower levels of institutions are demanded when those who can benefit from opportunistic behavior, i.e. low trustworthiness individuals, can also vote for them. Importantly, the presence of insurance crowds out civic spirit even when subjects can choose the no insurance option: trustworthiness when formal institutions are available is lower than in their absence.

Keywords: institutions, trust, trustworthiness, voting, insurance

JEL Classification: C920, D020, D640

Suggested Citation

Cabrales, Antonio and Clots-Figueras, Irma and Hernán-González, Roberto and Kujal, Praveen, Institutions, Opportunism and Prosocial Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence (2020). CESifo Working Paper No. 8323, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3618848 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3618848

Antonio Cabrales (Contact Author)

University College London - Department of Economics ( email )

Drayton House, 30 Gordon Street
30 Gordon Street
London, WC1H 0AX
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Charles III University of Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Irma Clots-Figueras

University of Kent ( email )

Keynes College
Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NP
United Kingdom

Roberto Hernán-González

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Praveen Kujal

Middlesex University ( email )

The Burroughs
London, NW4 4BT
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
34
Abstract Views
292
PlumX Metrics