The Anticompetitiveness of Sharing Prices

32 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2020 Last revised: 10 Mar 2021

Date Written: September 20, 2020

Abstract

Competitors privately sharing price intentions is universally prohibited under antitrust/competition law. In contrast, there is no common well-accepted treatment of competitors privately sharing prices. This paper shows that firms sharing prices leads to higher prices. Based on this theory of harm, it is argued that there should be a per se prohibition on sharing prices.

Keywords: Information exchange, prices, antitrust

JEL Classification: L13, L41

Suggested Citation

Harrington Jr, Joseph E., The Anticompetitiveness of Sharing Prices (September 20, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3621073 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3621073

Joseph E. Harrington Jr (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19102
Philadelphia, PA 19104

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