EU Merger Control and Small Member State Interests

THE PROS AND CONS OF MERGER CONTROL: 10th ANNIVERSARY OF THE SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY, Swedish Competition Authority, ed., Swedish Competition Authority, Stockholm, 2002

Posted: 24 Feb 2003

See all articles by Johan Stennek

Johan Stennek

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Henrik Horn

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Bruegel

Date Written: August 2002

Abstract

The paper explores the debate on whether firms in small countries are at a disadvantage because of EU merger control. Markets are often national, making it harder for firms in small countries to merge simply because they would very soon reach critical market shares, although they would still be relatively small in absolute size. It may therefore be beneficial for a small country to allow mergers that potentially hurt domestic consumers, since they have the advantage of making the companies large enough to be internationally competitive. A counter argument is that sacrificing consumer interests is not necessary since the companies can engage in cross-border mergers instead.

Keywords: Merger Control, Collective Dominance, Merger Simulation, European Commission, Merger Regulation, Economic Models, Antitrust, Mergers, Oligopoly

JEL Classification: L13, L41

Suggested Citation

Stennek, Johan and Horn, Henrik, EU Merger Control and Small Member State Interests (August 2002). THE PROS AND CONS OF MERGER CONTROL: 10th ANNIVERSARY OF THE SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY, Swedish Competition Authority, ed., Swedish Competition Authority, Stockholm, 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=362120

Johan Stennek (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden
+46 8 665 4536 (Phone)
+46 8 665 4599 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Henrik Horn

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ-law.se

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ-law.se

Bruegel ( email )

Rue de la Charité 33
B-1210 Brussels Belgium, 1210
Belgium

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