The Game Theory of the European Union versus the Pax Romana

Abstract

Game theorists recommend the strategy of the Pax Romana: if you want peace, prepare for war. It is conditional aggressiveness. The better alternative is the conditional generosity that the European Union prefers.

These strategies may belong to the game known as the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: peace (mutual cooperation) rests on a threat to punish; to that end, players should maintain their threat. In the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, the best response for a strategy of always cooperate is to always defect. Yet these strategies may belong to the game known as in the stag hunt game. In it, the best response to the strategy of “always cooperate” is cooperative, including the strategy to always cooperate. The game that the European Union plays is nearer to the stag hunt game than to the prisoner’s dilemma game: every European Union country now (rightly, of course) recognizes peace is as best for it―better even than an attack on a neighbor that would lead to an immediate victory.

Keywords: Game Theory, International Law, Generosity, Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Cooperation, Peace and War