Equity Market Structure Regulation: Time to Start Over

48 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2020

See all articles by Paul G. Mahoney

Paul G. Mahoney

University of Virginia School of Law

Date Written: June 8, 2020

Abstract

Over the past half century, the SEC’s regulations have gradually become key determinants of the way in which stocks trade and the fees that exchanges charge for their services. The current equity market structure rules are contained in the SEC’s Regulation NMS. The theory behind Regulation NMS is that a system of dispersed markets operating pursuant to SEC-mandated information and order routing links will provide the benefits of consolidation and competition simultaneously.

This paper argues that Regulation NMS has failed in that quest. It discourages exchange innovation, provides insufficient incentives for traders to price orders aggressively, forces the SEC to act as a price regulator, requires brokers to act against their customers’ interests, and creates questionable incentives for market participants, possibly producing socially excessive investments in speed and secrecy.

The paper contends that the SEC should replace Regulation NMS with three simple design principles — exchange autonomy, regulatory consistency, and issuer choice. These would allow market forces rather than regulatory mandates to determine the design and pricing of trading platforms and the trading strategies of broker-dealers. They would better align the private incentives of trading platforms with the social objectives of fostering liquidity and price discovery.

Keywords: Reg NMS, equity market structure, trading markets

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G18

Suggested Citation

Mahoney, Paul G., Equity Market Structure Regulation: Time to Start Over (June 8, 2020). Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2020-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3622291

Paul G. Mahoney (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

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United States
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